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Abstract 
This work examines the influence of Coasian thought on the analysis of the 
concept of externalities as used by economists and legal economists. Ronald 
Coase, a Chicago scholar, advanced a series of critiques of the Pigovian tax 
system; the theorem that bears his name is merely the best known. In his 1960 
work, he sought to demonstrate that the internationalization of social costs was 
not always socially useful.  In addition, he identified other institutional solutions 
to which systems can – and often do – resort. One of these solutions is to simply 
authorise the harmful activity without introducing mechanisms to internalize 
social costs. Beyond the abstraction of his ideas, Coase’s method of analysis has 
not had a great influence on economists’ thinking. His theorem, as it is commonly 
known, looks more like an elegant, abstract reflection then a tool for identifying 
institutional solutions to concrete societal problems.  
Among legal economists, however, Coase’s teachings have had a greater 
influence.  Unfortunately, even within this group of scholars, the convinction that 
external costs should, optimally, be internalized often emerges almost 
unconsciously in their literature. 
The risk inherent in this attitude lies in the possibility of finding systems for 
internalizing social costs in legal institutions which do not appear to have such an 
underlying logic, as for example some kinds of tort liability. 
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INTRODUCTION∗ 
 
The 1960 article by Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost1, begins as a 
critique of the thinking of Pigou, the father of Welfare Economics, as well as the 
Pigovian tradition.  According to Pigou when faced with a harmful action, 
lawmakers should develop a mechanism to internalize the external costs.  This 
would force the actor to consider in his cost-benefit analyses all the social costs 
associated  with his activity, including those that fall on others. Pigou believed 
that this internalization could be best effectuated by imposing a tax equal to the 
external cost upon the actor. Since the actor would only have an incentive to 
conduct his activities up to the point at which his net benefit equalled the external 
cost, society would reach a Pareto-efficient situation. 
Coase also recalls the oral Pigovian tradition according to which internalization of 
social costs associated with the actor's activity should have been possible to 
implement through the institution of civil liability. Theoretically, this regime, 
would force the actor to consider, in his own selfish calculations, external costs as 
well.  These costs would be internalized to the extent that the compensation that 
the actor must pay equals the externality caused by him or her. 
The logic of internalization of Pigou’s followers therefore always led them to hold 
that for every harmful action it was necessary to come up with a mechanism 
suitable for ensuring that the actor would consider any external cost as his own. 
That it was necessary to force the actor to internalize the externality. 
In his 1960 work, Coase makes a series of observations following this line of 
reasoning, and proposes others in his 1988 article.2 
He wanted to demonstrate that the world in which every harmful activity has a tax 
or some other mechanism for internalising the external costs associated with it 
                                                 
∗ I wish to thank Stefano Cappiello, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Roberta De Santis, Carlo Drago, Maria 
Cecilia Paglietti and Paolo Santella for their useful counsel. To Francesco Parisi and Andrea Zoppini I 
wish to express my gratitude for their constant encouragement. I am responsible for any errors. 
1 Ronald H. Coase,  The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law Econ. 1  (1960), now in Ronald H. Coase,  The 
Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988). 
2 Ronald H. Coase,  Notes on the Problem  of Social Cost, in The Firm, the Market and the Law, suprea 
note 1 at   157-195 
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was unrealistic.  He proposed that this abstract world could only exist in the minds 
of scholars, as a  “blackboard economy,” as he said in 19883.  
In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase highlights the fact that legal rules 
govern harmful activities in a way that does not correspond to an internalization 
of social costs mechanism. Legal rules, in fact, normally authorize or prohibit 
certain activities.  They do not allow the actor to carry out certain actions as long 
as he is willing to bear the consequences; consequences which may consist of 
paying a tax or compensating the harm.4 
It may be said that law, even in promoting economic efficiency, performs an 
assessment of the social desirability or undesirability of a certain activity, which 
implies the actor's direct measurement of the private benefit and of the external 
costs deriving from that behavior. 
The internalization mechanism has the great advantage of ensuring that the actor 
utilizes his own information to assess whether it is better to give up an activity, 
carry out that activity while taking precautions, or to carry out the activity without 
taking precautions. Thus, the private benefit, in the event that the external costs 
are perfectly internalizable through the tax or compensation for the harm, 
coincides with the social benefit. 5 
                                                 
3 R. H.  Coase, Notes of the Problem of Social Costs, supra note 1 at 59. 
4 Legal rules that seem to incorporate the Pigovian logic of internalization of external costs are called, in  
the wake of the seminal work by Calabresi e Melamed, “liability rules” (Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. R. 
1089 (1972)). 
5 Sometimes the expression “internalization of external costs” is used purely to indicate the fact that, 
through various mechanisms, the regulation ensures that human actions are carried out only up to the point 
where the social benefits equal the social costs. Hence this does not refer exclusively to the mechanism 
outlined earlier by virtue of which the actor’s information is used to arrive at an optimum activity level. So 
if the regulation considers that the efficient level of a certain conduct is 3 (e.g., the owner of a dog may 
choose to go to the park three times a day), then it may impose a very high sanction not commensurate 
with the possible external harm against the subject who carries out that activity a fourth time. But in such a 
system we do not find those characteristics of the mechanisms of internalization which Pigou seemed to be 
thinking of: that is, attribution to the actor of the choice whether to bear the external costs or take 
precautions, or, finally, give up the activity. To me, it seems more appropriate to use the expression 
“internalization of social costs” to refer only to those mechanisms which utilise the private information of 
the subjects, impelling them to compare external costs, internalized through the negative consequences 
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Ronald Coase criticizes this mechanism championed by Pigou and his followers. 6 
The idea that goes by the name “Coase Theorem” is merely one of the 
observations that Coase makes about Pigou’s reasoning.7  The observation is in 
fact valid to the extent that the transaction costs are negligible.  However, if we 
put transaction costs back into the analysis, Pigou’s reasoning appears to have 
some validity.  If we hold that transaction costs cannot be left out, it’s then 
Coase’s other criticisms of the Pigovian tradition that need to be considered. 
Coase’s intention was to show that there are institutional solutions other than the 
Pigovian tax system for promoting economic efficiency.  
Legal rules can, for instance, facilitate negotiations among the parties. 
But the main idea in Coase's work is that some harmful activities can be assessed 
by the legal system as purely lawful; without the provision of a mechanism for 
internalizing the external costs. 
Coase makes four criticisms of the Pigovian tradition. These can be described as: 
“the reciprocal nature of the problem;” “Coase Theorem;” “joint causation of 
harm;” and “the costs of assessing and verifying external costs.” 
 
1. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF EXTERNALITY 
The first criticism is, as summarised by the Chicago economist, “the reciprocal 
nature of the problem.” 8  
Coase writes:  
 
                                                                                                                                                
contemplated by the regulation, with the private benefits of the action. This conception of the mechanism 
of internalization of social costs seems to conform better to the idea Pigou expresses in his works. 
6 In his works, Ronald Coase was often critical of the rule “price = marginal cost” championed by 
economists. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Firm the Market and the Law, in The Firm the Market and The 
Law,, supra note 1 at 16 ff. We seem to find the same criticism of the idea that any harmful conduct should 
be carried out to the point where the social benefits equal the social costs. 
7 In discussing a world without transaction costs, he states that “in reality, it does not seem worthwhile to 
waste time analysing (its) properties.” Ronald H. Coase, The Firm the Market and the Law, aupra note 1 at 
15. 
8 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, , supra note 1 at  2. 
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“The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has 
to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm 
on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. 
We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B 
would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be 
allowed to harm B or should B allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the 
most serious harm.” 9 
 
Coase thus shows that externalities are the result of subjective rights. 
Giving  a right to a person  allows him to  cause harm to third parties. In his 
article, the Chicago economist uses his classic example to adumbrate this concept: 
 
 “I instanced in my previous article the case of a confectioner the noise 
and vibrations from whose machinery disturb a doctor in his work. To 
avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner. … 
Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which 
destroys crops on neighbouring land. If it is inevitable that some cattle 
will stray, an increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the 
expense of a decrease in the supply of crops.”10 
 
Giving the confectioner the right to make noise allows him to inflict an externality 
upon the doctor. Recognising the doctor’s right to prevent the confectioner’s noise 
allows the doctor to inflict an externality on the confectioner. Likewise, 
authorising the cattle-raiser to invade the farmer’s cropland allows him to inflict 
harm upon the farmer. Recognizing the farmer’s right to keep animals from 
wandering onto his land allows him to harm the cattle-raiser. The difference lies 
only in the fact that, in the first case, the externality derives from an action which 
the subject takes, whereas in the second case the externality derives from the 
impediment created by the right. 
Hence, Coase’s reflections highlight some gaps in the way economists reason. 
                                                 
9 Ronald H. Coase, ID at  2. 
10 Ronald H. Coase, ID at 2. 
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Indeed, normally we think of an externality when we assume that a certain subject 
does not have the right to carry out a certain activity.  
That means that mainly we imagine the existence of an externality only when a 
certain action may cause harm to others, not when a subject's action may prevent 
others from carrying out a productive activity beneficial to others.  
For example, typically in analyzing problems associated with the use of property 
(in particular real estate), we think about the externality that arises when a subject 
invades the physical space of other people’s property.  However, we do not think 
of the external diseconomy that results when a subject prevents others from 
invading the physical space of his own property.   
In addition, it is possible to develop Coase’s thinking by considering some other 
examples: the production of emissions or the right not to have people passing 
through or parking on one’s land both include the possibility of inflicting harm on 
others.11 In the first case, the externality derives from the subject’s action, an 
action whose effects have repercussions in the spatial sphere of others’ property. 
In the second case, the externality derives from the prohibition established by the 
law and the action does not impact the spatial sphere of others’ rights. In both 
these hypotheses, however, any protection of a claim by a subject involves a cost 
to others for which no recompense is paid, i.e., an externality.  
Moreover, the right to fly over someone else’s land is the source of an external 
cost; a sacrifice must be borne by the owner of the land.  Notably, however, the 
right to prevent planes from passing over one’s land also causes an externality; 
those interested in flying over the land experience a loss of utility. 
Economists and jurists – this is one of Coase’s lessons – should not remain tied to 
a predetermined concept of causality.  Thus, a legally protected claim cannot 
simply be denied to the subject who “causes” the harm. The law must choose the 
                                                 
11 The example of the right to prevent others from parking on one’s land is proffered by Coase himself.  
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 44. 
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solution that ensures the greatest net social benefit even if this means that an 
action may impose a cost on others.12 
In fact, property, or the very right to exclusive use of a thing, involves an 
externality; a sacrifice borne by the subjects who might have otherwise utilized 
the item.13 
At this point, it is important to examine the verity of  Coase’s first criticism of the 
Pigovian tradition.14 
Pigou and his followers believed that the introduction of a tax, or the provision of 
compensation for harm was the solution to the problem of external costs. The 
solution of an absolute prohibition of the activity in question15 is never addressed 
(at least explicitly) in Pigou’s work.16 
                                                 
12 This is the direction Italian law takes when, for example, art. 840 of the Civil Code stipulates that: “the 
owner of the land may not oppose the activities of third parties conducted at such a depth in the subsoil or 
at such a height in the overlying air that he has no interest in excluding them.” 
13 It could be said that the very idea of a legally protected claim arose because the exercise of a right 
normally involves a sacrifice for the other subjects (also including the lost utility of those who wanted to 
utilise the resource). It is however possible to imagine that an activity that does not cause any harm to third 
parties ought also to be subject to a legally protected claim. Think of a person who uses his own 
playstation at a time when no one wishes to use that playstation at the same time. Assume that the place 
occupied by that person does not interfere with anyone. In this case it can be stated that the individual’s 
activity does not cause harm to third parties. However, it may be desirable to attribute a right to that 
subject, i.e., a legally protected claim, to avoid rent seeking activity: someone in fact might try to block the 
subject’s activity for the sole purpose of taking over part of his wealth. Hence the need to prevent the 
carrying out of costly activities directed solely at redistributing wealth among associates may lead to 
attributing rights to activities that cause no harm to anyone.  
14 Coase’s analysis was followed up by a clarification in 1962 by Buchanan and Stubblebine, who 
distinguish between “Pareto relevant externalities” and “Pareto  irrelevant externalities”. 
According to these two economists, a Paretian relevant externality is when the cost inflicted on third 
parties is greater than the net benefit obtained by the actor, and for which a mutually advantageous 
agreement would be possible. Thus when an actor obtains from an action a benefit of 5 while causing a 
damage of 10, we are dealing with a Paretian relevant externality. If the benefit is 10 and the harm is 5, 
then the externality is Pareto irrelevant. Only in the former case is there an inefficiency. Hence we must 
imagine that when economists speak of externalities, they mean to refer only to Pareto relevant 
externalities, it being socially not desirable to eliminate the others ( James M. Buchanan and William C. 
Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371 (1962)). 
15 A price could be paid for all externalities that are produced only in the event that the State, by means of 
Walrasian auctioneers, put up for auction all legally protected rights. In a system of laws in which some 
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Thus, at first glance it might seem that Coase’s first observation on Pigou’s 
thinking is off the mark. However, at closer reading, the Chicago economist’s 
analysis sheds light on a situation that is normally neglected by the Pigovian 
approach.  Where the law gives a subject the right to prohibit a certain activity the 
problem of externalities arises as it would in any other case, and it is possible that 
the private cost which the holder of the veto power manages to avoid by 
exercising his power is in fact lower than the lost utility for the subject who 
sought to carry out a certain action.  Pigou seems to be referring in fact only to 
activities that cause harm to third parties. 
How can we explain the fact that economists have not noted the possibility of 
inefficient results in this case, i.e., in the event that a subject has the power to 
prevent a harmful activity? 
The answer can be found in the second criticism that Ronald Coase advances 
against the Pigovian tradition, a criticism represented by his well-known theorem.  
 
2. EFFICIENCY IS EVER ASSURED: COASE THEOREM 
 
Once we have revealed the reciprocal nature of externalities, it would seem that 
the solution to the problem of correcting external effects becomes more 
complicated. The solution cannot in fact lie in the prohibition of harmful 
activities, since such a prohibition would involve a social cost represented by the 
loss of benefits that such activities may yield.  The solution lies in prohibiting 
certain harmful activities and authorising others, or in reducing those harmful 
activities to an optimum level.  
                                                                                                                                                
rights are attributed directly to individuals, without their having to pay a price, there will be cases when a 
human behaviour that involves costs for third parties may be engaged in without there being negative 
consequences of any type for the injurer. It is then possible that private cost and social cost diverge (if the 
conditions required by Coase’s theorem are not met).  
16 Coase moreover notes that Pigou calls “anti-social” any human activity “that causes harm to anyone 
whosoever” ( Ronald H.. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1 at 35). 
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However, this problem disappears in the presence of a particular condition 
identified by Ronald Coase, a condition consisting of the “absence of transaction 
costs.” 
Thus, we come to the second idea presented by the Chicago economist in his 1960 
article, consisting of the theorem that bears his name. 
Coase did not formulate the theorem, however. In addition, it has multiple 
definitions. 
One formulation that is however to be found in the Coase’s article can be 
presented as follows: in the absence of transaction costs, the harm caused to 
others by a subject’s activity also constitutes a cost for the actor – more precisely, 
an opportunity cost – represented by the missed gain obtainable through an 
agreement with the victim.  
Private cost and social cost are thus equal, in the absence of transaction costs, 
since the cost incurred by another is a benefit lost for the actor. The externality is 
therefore always internalized in the form of a lost gain. 
In order to keep the activity from being carried out, the victim would be willing to 
pay a sum equal at most to the harm which he would otherwise suffer if the 
harmful activity were carried out.  Thus, in assessing whether it is worthwhile to 
carry out a certain harmful activity, the actor should  consider the benefit he will 
lose if he decides to carry out the activity rather than come to an agreement with 
the victim to avoid the activity. 
Coase’s theorem can also be described  by saying that “in the absence of 
transaction costs, the right always ends up in the hands of the one who values it 
more.” Imagine the case where Tom, owner of a piece of land, has the right to 
prevent Dick from letting his herd of cattle graze on the land. Suppose also that 
Tom values that right more than Dick is willing to pay. 
Here, the right being considered is not simply the right to let one’s herd graze; it is 
a two-sided right: the right to have one’s herd graze and the right not to have the 
herd graze on one’s own land. 
The proposition that “the right always ends up in the hands of the one who values 
it more” indicates that  since Tom holds the right not to have the neighbour’s herd 
grazing on his land, he will not grant it (since Dick will not be willing to pay the 
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minimum amount that Tom requires to grant it). However,  if Tom did not hold 
the right to prevent the herd from grazing on his land, he would acquire it from 
Dick (since Dick is willing to grant it for a sum lower than the maximum amount 
that Tom is willing to pay;  Tom “values the right more.”) Regardless of the initial 
attribution of rights,  at the conclusion of any negotiations Tom will hold the right 
not to have the neighbour’s herd grazing on his land. 
With regard to the right to conduct harmful activities, the assertion that, in the 
absence of transaction costs, the right will end up in the hands of the one who 
values it more means that these activities will be carried out if the actors value the 
right to perform them more than the victims value the right to prevent them, 
regardless of the right’s initial configuration. 
Hence the right is double-sided. One may have the right to perform a certain 
activity, or the right to keep that activity from being performed. Coase’s theorem 
states that, in the absence of transaction costs and regardless of the initial 
attribution of claims, the right will always appear in the form that has the greater 
value. 
Now we must determine whether Coase’s second criticism of Pigou’s thinking is 
on target. 
It should be noted that the Chicago economist himself considered the world 
without transaction costs to be quite far removed from his own idea of the real 
world. So it can be said that, since transaction costs do in fact exist, and thus we 
cannot rely on private accords to correct externalities up to the efficient level, 
Pigou’s argument remains valid. In other words, since the prescriptions of Coase 
Theorem are not applicable to a world with positive transaction costs, externalities 
must be corrected through other mechanisms and cannot rely on negotiation 
between individuals. 
Coase seems cognizant of this. Immediately after advancing the idea that became 
associated with his name, in fact, he formulates his third criticism of Pigou’s 
reasoning, represented by the problem of the “joint causation of harm.” 
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3. NOTHING WORKS: JOINT CAUSATION OF HARM AND THE 
PARADOX OF PERFECT COMPENSATION 
 
Having shown the reciprocal nature of externalities and the non-existence of the 
problem when transaction costs are absent, Coase describes the problem 
represented by the joint causation of harm, which leads to what Robert Cooter 
would call the “paradox of compensation.”17 
Coase asserts:  
 
“Assume that a factory which emits smoke is set up in a district 
previously free from smoke pollution, causing damage valued $100 per 
annum. Assume that the taxation solution is adopted and that the factory 
owner is taxed $100 per annum as long as the factory emits smoke. 
Assume further that a smoke-preventing device costing $90 per annum 
to run is available,. In these circumstances, the smoke-preventing device 
would be installed. Damage of $100 would have been avoided at a an 
expenditure of $90 and the factory-owner would be better off by $10 per 
annum. Yet the position achieved may not be optimal. Suppose that 
those who suffer the damage could avoid it by moving to other locations 
or by taking various precautions which would cost them, or be 
equivalent to a loss in income of, $40 per annum. Then there would be a 
gain in the value of production of $50 if the factory continued to emit its 
smoke and those now in the district moved elsewhere or made other 
adjustments to avoid the damage.”18  
 
Coase thus highlights the problem by which the amount of harm deriving from a 
certain activity may depend also on the activity carried out by the victim, for 
which reason it seems that the optimal social solution would be to apply certain 
precautionary charges to the victim, or restrict his activity. 
                                                 
17 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal. L. R. 1 (1985),  
p. 3. 
18 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1 at 41.. 
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Those cases in which the promotion of efficiency requires that the victim take 
some measures to mitigate the harm are usually termed: “cases of bilateral 
precaution” or “cases of joint causation of harm.”19 
As Cooter notes:  
 
“When each individual bears the full benefits and costs of his 
precaution, economists say value is internalized. When an individual 
bears part of the benefits or part of the costs of his precaution, 
economists say that some social value is externalized. The advantage of 
internalization is that the individual sweeps all of the values affected by 
his actions into his calculus of self-interest, so that self-interest compels 
him to balance all the costs and benefits of his actions. According to the 
marginal principle, social efficiency is achieved by balancing all costs 
and benefits. Thus, the incentives of private individuals are socially 
efficient when costs and benefits are fully internalized, whereas 
incentives are inefficient when some costs and benefits are externalized. 
In situations when both the injurer and the victim can take precaution 
against the harm, the internalization of costs require both parties to bear 
the full cost of the harm. To illustrate, suppose that smoke from a 
factory soils the wash at a commercial laundry, and the parties fail to 
solve the problem by private negotiation. One solution is to impose a 
pollution tax equal the harm caused by the smoke. The factory will bear 
the tax and the laundry will bear the smoke, so pollution costs will be 
internalized by both of them, as required by social efficiency. In 
general, when precaution is bilateral, the marginal principle requires 
both parties to be fully responsible for the harm. The efficacy condition 
is called double responsibility at the margin.” 20 
                                                 
19 Although the expression “cases of bilateral precaution” would seem to refer solely to those cases in 
whose presence it is desirable for there to be precautionary duties for the victim, the expression can 
however also be used in those cases in which it is socially useful to control the victim’s own level of 
activity. 
20 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, supra note 18 at 3 . 
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Internalization through the mechanism of strict liability, a mechanism which some 
economists seem to point to as the solution to the problem of external costs,21 then 
seems in many cases inefficient.  In fact, it is not capable of producing the optimal 
incentives for the victim. 
As Cooter states:  
 
«One problem  with the combination of justice and efficiency, however, is 
that compensation in its simplest form is inconsistent with double 
responsibility at the margin. In the preceding example, justice may require 
the factory not only to pay for harm caused by the smoke, but also to 
compensate the laundry for the harm. Compensation, however, permits the 
laundry to externalize costs, thereby compromising efficiency. Thus a 
paradox results: If the factory can pollute with impunity, harm is 
externalized by the factory; if the factory must pay full compensation, harm 
is externalized from the laundry; if compensation is partial, harm is partly 
externalised by the factory and partly externalized by the laundry.”22 
 
The “paradox of perfect compensation” is explained as follows in a well-known 
textbook of economic analysis of law: 
 
“Consider this paradox: (1) In order for the injurer to internalize costs, 
he or she must pay full compensation to the victim. (2) In order for the 
victim to internalize costs, he or she must receive no compensation for 
injurer. (3) In private law, compensation paid by the injure equals 
compensation received by the victim. Therefore, private law cannot 
internalize costs for the injurer and the victim as required for efficiency 
… The paradox has a solution.  In fact, efficient incentives do not 
                                                 
21 In his 1960 article, Ronald Coase makes his criticisms mainly against that system of internalization of 
social costs represented by the institution of tort liability. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, supra note 1. 
22 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contact, and Property: The Model of Precaution, supra note 18 at 4. 
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require internalization of total costs. Instead, efficient incentives require 
the internalization of marginal costs…. This paradox points out a 
problem that afflicts all areas of the law.” 23 
 
To examine this problem in greater depth, consider the following example: Dick 
takes his child to the park, and Tom takes his dog. If the dog bites the child, it can 
be said that Tom’s action has harmed Dick. Compensation, however, means that 
one’s own harm is turned into an externality, that is, into an external harm. If a 
system of strict liability exists, as in the example at hand,  Dick’s decision to take 
his child to the park harms Tom.  
Coase’s third criticism of the Pigovian tradition seems to address this issue in 
part: internalization through the mechanism of strict liability can in fact lead to 
inefficient outcomes. 
But the double liability at the margin that Cooter speaks of can be achieved 
through various mechanisms.  This result is ensured by the system of  fault 
liability and strict liability combined with a defence, which may consist of the 
contributory negligence defence or the comparative negligence defence.  
In this regard, however, two observations can be made: 
- First, these systems do not achieve complete internalization of social costs. In 
the system of liability for negligence, the injurer does not internalize the external 
costs deriving from his diligent conduct; in the system of strict liability 
accompanied by a defence, the injured does not internalize the external costs due 
to conduct in compliance with the standard of diligence.  
Consequently, in the presence of a system of liability for negligence, the harmful 
activity can be carried out up to an inefficient level; the actor will not  compare 
his benefits with the external harm caused by his activity when the activity 
complies with the legal standard of diligence. In a system of strict liability 
accompanied by a defence the victim’s activity will be carried to inefficient 
levels; the victim will not compare his benefits with the harm that the injurer must 
bear by virtue of the benefits transfer carried out by the law. 
                                                 
23 Robert Cooter and  Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics,  Second Edition, Reading (Mass): Addison-
Wesley, 1995, p. 233. 
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- Finally, it’s important to note that  in these systems  the traditional 
mechanism of internalization of external costs is absent. Indeed, the law directly 
assesses the level of precaution adopted by the subject (injurer and injured) and 
expresses a judgment that either penalises or approves the behaviour. 
-  In the case of liability for negligence, the injurer’s diligent behaviour is 
purely lawful. The same must be said for the injured’s behaviour in the case of 
strict liability. There isn’t any system of internalization on external costs 
However, the observations offered up to this point are valid only with regard 
to a certain system of internalization of social costs: the system that hinges on the 
aquilian liability of the actor. 
Is this criticism also valid with regard to Pigovian taxes?  
Such taxes create a system of decoupled liability: 24 both subjects, injurer and 
injured, bear the costs deriving from the harmful activity, as required by 
efficiency. The injurer bears the tax, whilst the injured bears the harm. It would 
seem then that Coase’s third observation does not compromise the validity of 
Pigou’s system.  William Baumol came to this conclusion in 1972.25 
 
4. THE COSTS OF ASSESSING AND PAYING DAMAGES AND 
PIGOVIAN TAXES 
 
Baumol’s reasoning  led to the widely held belief that  the Pigovian tax 
mechanism was  a usable instrument to pursue economic efficiency.  
The three criticisms examined up to this point were not able to significantly 
weaken the validity of the Pigovian tax system: such taxes, in fact, do not involve 
                                                 
24 A system of decoupled liability is a system in which the payment that must be made by the author of the 
harmful conduct differs from the payment received by the victim. In a Pigovian tax system, the amount 
received by the victim is zero. There are other cases in which decoupling occurs. For example, many 
American states provide that, when punitive damages are granted, only 67% of the amount paid by the 
defendant goes to the actor, while the remainder is assigned to the state. The concept of decoupled liability 
was introduced in 1980 by Warren Schwartz. See Warren Schwartz,  An Overview of the Economics of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 68 Geo. L. J. 1075 (1980). 
25 William J. Baumol, On  Taxation and the Control of Externalities,  62 Amer.  Ec. Rev. 307 (1972). 
 17 
absolute prohibition of certain activities, do not require that transaction costs be 
zero, and achieve decoupling.  
Conscious of this, Coase responded to Baumol in 1988, developing new 
arguments. 
His attention focused on the difficulty of assessing the social damages caused by a 
harmful activity.  
Baumol’s analysis had shown that the amount of the Pigovian tax had to be 
calculated by taking into account not only the actual harm but also the “reduction 
in the production value,”26 making the regulator’s work more complex. Coase 
underscored the informational problems a regulatory authority would encounter in 
setting a system of Pigovian taxes. 
 
 
5. OUTGROWTHS OF COASE’S IDEAS 
 
In the years following publication of The Problem of Social Cost, certain themes 
involving the problem of internalization of social costs were dealt with by some of 
the most eminent American legal economists.27 This debate is still under way; its 
concepts are still being explored and new  theories  developed. 
 
5.1 The contrast between regulation and civil liability in the work of Steven 
Shavell. 
In the early 1980’s, Steven Shavell analysed the problem of whether mechanisms 
for internalising social costs were efficient. .28 He pondered the relative 
advantages of  civil liability versus direct regulation, and identified some general 
principles to guide the selection of a system.  
                                                 
26 That is, the tax must be calculated taking into account the possibility that the victim may take efficient 
precautions or may reduce the harm by limiting or stopping his own activity. 
27 Cf. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984) and 
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Col. L. Rev. 1523 (1984). 
28 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, supra note 28. 
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According to Shavell, it is important to first assess the parties' awareness of the 
the activity’s degree of riskiness.29 If the private parties have a higher degree of 
awareness than the regulator regarding the riskiness of a certain activity, then a 
mechanism for internalising social costs seems preferable to direct regulation. 
This solution seems sensible  in the event that the internalization mechanism 
consists of strict liability. However, it  has the disadvantage of always requiring 
payment for damages, with the attendant administrative costs. 
Liability for negligence does not have this disadvantage; under this type of 
regime, damages are only assessed in the presence of negligence. 
However, liability for negligence requires that the court establishes the efficient 
level of prevention, thereby forfeiting the indirect use of the information 
possessed by the actor to determine efficient precautions. However, with regard to 
direct regulation, this evaluation should occur ex post facto, and the court could be 
sufficiently prepared to carry out such an analysis. 
It bears repeating that the institution of liability for negligence involves certain 
activities, so long as they are carried out in compliance with the legal standard of 
diligence, being authorised by law, without any mechanism for internalising 
social costs being set up. This means that the activity level may be carried out up 
to an inefficient level. 
The liability mechanism, according to Shavell, seems preferable to regulation 
even in the event that the administrative costs that the regulator must bear to 
ensure compliance with the regulation are high.30 Even in this case, however, only 
liability for negligence, and not strict liability, can normally present a clear 
advantage over direct regulation. This is because only liability for negligence 
involves the finding of damages and the assessment of the optimal level of 
diligence being made in limited hypotheses (when the actor does not seem to be 
up to the standard of diligence). Strict liability instead requires the finding and 
payment of damages whenever the harmful event occurs. 
                                                 
29 Steven Shavell, ID at 359. 
30 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, supra note 28 at363. 
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The other two factors examined by Shavell are: 1) the possibility that the injurer is 
unable to pay the damages, and 2) the risk that the injurer manages to avoid being 
ordered to pay compensation for the damage.31 
These two conditions may make direct regulation preferable to the mechanism of 
liability, whether liability for negligence or strict liability as the presence of either 
factor would diminish the subjects’ incentives for taking precautions. 
 
5.2 Prices and sanctions in Robert Cooter’s thinking 
That same year, Robert Cooter took up the conceptual difference between prices 
and sanctions.32 
According to Cooter, the price is the amount of money required by law for an 
allowed activity, while the sanction is the negative consequence associated with a 
prohibited activity.33 In Cooter’s analysis, he seeks to determine when  a legal 
system concerned with economic efficiency should resort to sanctions rather than 
to prices.  In Cooter’s analysis only prices reflect the logic of internalization of 
social costs. 
Initially,34 Cooter adopts a  paradigm to identify when  a negative consequence 
established by a law can be called a sanction and not a price.  He determines that  
a consequence is a sanction if: 1) a psychological factor of the act is relevant; 
and/or 2) a negative consequence is increased in the event that the harmful 
consequence is repeated.35  
                                                 
31 Steven Shavell, ID at  360 and 363. 
32 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, supra note 28 at 1523 
33 ID supra note 28  a7 1523. 
34 ID supra note 28 at 1537. 
35 “The efficient price depends on  the level of external harm, not on the actor’s state of mind.” Robert 
Cooter, Prices and Sanction, supra note 28 at 1537.  
Cooter also identifies a more general rule for identifying sanctions: he states that, if the actor can take 
various levels of precaution, we are dealing with a sanction when the law creates a discontinuity, that is, a 
jump in the curve of the actor’s expected costs such that, for the latter, if he acts as a rational and self- 
interested subject, he will take the desired precautions. 
The problem with this definition is that for some behaviours it is not possible to identify a different series 
of levels of precaution, as for example parking in a prohibited zone. Cf. Robert Cooter, Prices and 
Sanctions, cit., p. 1527. 
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A fundamental difference between prices and sanctions is the elasticity of the 
behaviour as certain variables change.  In the case of sanctions, the amount of 
precaution the subject takes is not very flexible in relation to change in the 
sanction, thus the behaviour is inelastic.  This is because a change in sanction  
creates a discontinuity in the curve of the actor’s expected costs; a discontinuity at 
the level of diligence desired by the system of law.  The actor’s behaviour is 
instead strongly responsive to changes in price, since this discontinuity is not 
present on the curve of expected costs.   
On the other hand, as the level of precaution required by a law providing for a 
sanction changes, the subject’s behaviour changes, since the subject is normally 
interested in conforming to the prescription. In the case of prices, though, a 
similar argument cannot be made, since there is no level of precaution required by 
the law. 
This leads to some indications of policy: if the public authorities can determine, 
relatively precisely, the ideal level of precautions and at the same time can make 
mistakes in measuring the external costs, then the use of sanctions is surely 
desirable. In the event that the public apparatus is capable of sucessfully 
estimating  the amount of the external costs and at the same time is unable to 
determine the optimum level of diligence, the use of a price system is desirable. 
The “possibility of gathering information” must then guide lawmakers in 
choosing between prices and sanctions.  The overall results arrived at by Cooter 
can be summarised in the following diagram: 
                                                                                                                                                
We may also hold that we are dealing with a sanction in the event that the system of laws attributes to 
public officials the ability to prevent a certain act from being carried out. It cannot in fact be asserted that 
the law approves a certain behaviour if the subject is willing to bear the consequences, when a prohibitive 
power is attributed to certain subjects. 
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                        Private Persons 
 
It may be observed that the mechanism of internalization of social costs is 
desirable only in one of the four hypotheses. More precisely, only when private 
persons are best observers of social benefits and official are best observers of 
social costs a system of prices is optimal. 
It is worth noting that, in the context of tort liability systems, Cooter places 
compensation of damages for negligence among the sanctions, and objective 
liability among the prices, confirming the impossibility of finding a mechanism in 
this institution for internalising social costs. 
 
 
5.3 Property rules, liability rules and subsequent interpretations. 
Even before Shavell and Cooter turned their attention to the general problem of 
internalization of social costs, the acquired wisdom of the reciprocal nature of 
externalities, together with an awareness of the problem that transaction costs may 
pose in achieving an efficient solution, led Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed36 to identify four rules relating to harmful activities that could be 
abstractly used to regulate such activities. 
They are as follows:  
                                                 
36 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral,,supra note 4. 
Legislative 
standard and 
sanction 
Official subsidy 
Official price Community standard and sanction 
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- Rule 1: the subject interested in the harmful activity does not have the right to 
carry it out and the potential victim has the power to prevent him from doing so. 
- Rule 2: the subject interested in the harmful activity does not have the right to 
carry it out; however, the potential victim cannot prevent him from doing so if the 
interested subject pays the indemnity set by the courts or by law. 
- Rule 3: the subject interested in the harmful activity has the right to carry it out 
and the potential victim cannot prevent him from doing so. 
- Rule 4: the subjected interested in the harmful activity has the right to carry it 
out; however, the potential victim can prevent him from doing so by paying the 
indemnity set by the courts or by law. 
Calabresi and Melamed determined that in order to achieve efficiency, it was 
necessary to prevent transaction costs from allowing externalities to exist.  In the 
course of their attempt to remove the inefficiencies caused by transaction costs,  
they discovered possible criteria  for choosing between rules 1 and 3 on the one 
hand, the so-called property rules, and rules 2 and 4 on the other, the so-called 
liability rules.  
 According to Calabresi and Melamed, the liability rules37 are preferable when 
transaction costs are high, since private negotiation is prevented by them, whereas 
                                                 
37 In the debate among legal economists, two different conceptions of liability rules seem to coexist. On 
the one hand, there are those for whom the liability rules are identified based on the consequences that the 
law attributes to a harmful behaviour: if these consequences specifically provides recovery, we are dealing 
with a liability rule. This approach runs into problems, however, in those cases in which the law can only 
provide for equivalent recovery, since compensation in specific form is materially impossible. This occurs, 
for example, when the effects of a harmful behaviour can be eliminated only for the future, not the present. 
Thus, in the case of an intolerable input, the injunctive remedy may be valid for the future, but for the 
behaviour already carried out the only sanction may be the payment of compensation for the harm. A 
classic hypothesis in which recovery in specific form is not possible is the death of a person. 
On the other hand, there are those for whom identification of the liability rules must occur based on the 
assessment that the law makes, reconstructable by means of certain indices, regarding the social 
desirability or undesirability of the harmful act: thus we are dealing with a liability rule when, for the law, 
social welfare increases in the event that a subject, aware of the consequences befalling him by virtue of 
his carrying out some harmful activity, engages in that activity nonetheless.  
The liability rule is therefore characterised  by providing a certain price for an activity, but even the use of 
the term price” may lead to misunderstandings: any cost deriving from a law can be considered the “price” 
which the subject must pay to carry out the activity covered by the law; however, it would seem more 
 23 
the property rules are preferable when transaction costs are low (and, hence, 
negotiation is possible).38  
The liability rules thus reformulate the logic of internalization of social costs, 
although only in situations of high transacion costs. 
Using the example given above, it is possible to see how the four rules can be 
applied. Dick accompanies his child to play in the park, while Tom takes his dog. 
There is a risk of harm caused by the dog possibly biting the child. 
- According to the first rule, Tom may not take his dog for a walk in the park, and 
Dick may obtain injunctive relief. Tom may obtain the right to take his dog only 
through an agreement with Dick (the property rule). 
- According to Rule 2, Tom may take his dog for a walk in the park but has to pay 
an indemnity to Dick, which indemnity may or may not correspond to the harm 
actually suffered by the child. In this way Dick’s right is restricted without any 
need for his consent (the liability rule). 
- According to Rule 3, Tom has the right to take his dog for a walk in the park. 
Since Dick is the one who must bear the harm that actually occurs, he may take 
his child to the park but at his own risk. He can acquire the right to have Tom not 
come to the park only through an agreement with Tom (the property rule). 
- According to Rule 4, Dick may prevent Tom from coming with the dog by 
paying the amount predetermined by law or set by the court. In this way Tom’s 
right is restricted without any need for his consent.39 
                                                                                                                                                
appropriate to use the term “price” when the law positively values the performance of that activity in the 
event that someone is willing to bear the consequences. This position can be explained with an example: 
the law may provide for a pecuniary sanction for the subject who travels a certain stretch of road closed to 
automobiles, or it might set a fare for those who intend to travel that stretch. In the first case, it can be said 
that social welfare does not increase when a subject engages in the behaviour of travelling the road even 
though he is aware that he will certainly be penalised; in the second case, it can be asserted that, when the 
subject decides to pay the fare and travel the road, social welfare undergoes a positive variation. 
The writer is unable to provide adequate bibliographic references, since these remarks are more the fruit of 
conversations held with legal economists than the product of readings. 
38 No explanation is offered however regarding the cases in which rule 1 is superior to rule 3. 
39 Normally, in examples like this, we think it is Tom who causes the harm, because the harm falls on 
Dick. 
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The explanation offered by Calabresi and Melamed, as based on transaction costs, 
appeared misleading to some authors.40  
It has in fact been shown that in the presence of low transaction costs the efficient 
solution can also be achieved  by instituting  a liability rule. The parties can in fact 
negotiate by taking into account the rule of law, and thus  reach the efficient 
solution. 
In addition, it has been proposed that the discipline of harmful externalities be 
distinguished from that of possessory interests41. This distinction cannot be said to 
have been definitively formulated and merits further exploration; however, it is 
one more criticism against the Pigouvian logic of internalization of social costs. 
Indeed, in the case of possessory interests, Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis leads us 
to prefer property rules over liability rules. This is because the use of liability 
rules leads to significant undesirable effects when the appropriation of a 
possessory interest is reconnected to an indemnity or compensation that is 
undervalued. 
The problem inherent in possessory interests is the possibility of the existing of a 
common value component. There is a common value component when a potential 
taker values an object for the same reasons of the owner . In this case, if the legal 
system gives an undervalued indemnity to the owner in case of takings, many 
forced trasfers are destined to take place. In this case, the subject wanting to take 
possession of the property invests resources in a purely redistributive activity; for 
his part, the subject risking expropriation modifies his choices, orienting himself 
                                                                                                                                                
But if we introduce a compensatory system by virtue of which Dick’s harm is transferred to Tom, then it 
seems clear that Dick’s actions cause harm to Tom. Therefore, the harm that Tom must bear depends either 
on Dick’s decision to take his child to the park or on the measures that Dick takes to avoid or reduce the 
harm. 
The situation is exactly turned around. 
40 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
Harv. L. R. 713 (1996). 
41 As explained by Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow, Property Rules versus Lialbility Rules, supra note 41 
at 716, note 2 , “ by the protection of possessory interests in things, we refer to the prevention of the 
unwanted transfer of possession of a physical object to a taker. By harmful externalities, we mean adverse 
outcomes that occur as a byproduct of an injurer’s activity, a familiar instance being pollution caused by a 
firm’s operations.” 
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towards property that can be expropriated only with greater difficulty, and takes 
precautions aimed at avoiding the expropriation, thus bearing costs not 
corresponding to social benefits. 
Therefore, mechanisms for internalising social costs, like the liability rules, do not 
seem desirable, even in the presence of high transaction costs. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ronald Coase’s intention when he wrote his 1960 article was to subject the 
Pigovian approach to the problem of externalities to a series of critiques. 
Economic thinkers have taken from Coase's work the idea that, in a world without 
transaction costs, Pigovian taxes and the mechanisms for compensating harm are 
useless. However, as the real world is a world with positive transaction costs, 
Pigou’s reasoning was considered most valid. Coase's critique of Pigou’s 
approach appeared nothing more than a refined theory in the textbooks of  welfare 
economics. Ronald Coase’s thinking is confined to the world of abstract ideas, 
and the prescription that every harmful action must be associated with a tax or 
mechanism for compensating the harm – a price, in other words – is still 
practicable.  
Regrettably, some of Coase's  other important observations  have not managed to 
influence the thinking of economists. 
In the light of the clarifications offered by him and other scholars, some of these  
concepts can be summarised as follows: 
- The internalization of external costs through the mechanism of strict liability 
carries with it significant administrative costs, since  the harm is not left on the 
subject who suffers it. This transferral  requires information about the amount of 
external damages.  This is information that a legal system  may not have readily 
available and thus it may make mistaken assessments of this damage, resulting in 
inefficiency.  Furthermore, the internalization of external costs through the 
mechanism of strict liability requires that a defence be introduced to encourage 
the injured to take precautions.  This defence requires the legal system to make a  
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direct assessment of whether or not the optimal level of precaution was adopted 
by the victim.  Finally, it is not suitable for maintaining the victim’s level within 
the efficient level.The legal system  may miscalaculate resulting in inefficiencies. 
- The internalization of external costs through Pigovian taxes does not present any 
of the drawbacks of the mechanism of strict liability, since it achieves decoupling, 
but it does carry with it heavy administrative costs and requires precise 
measurements of the external costs of harmful activities, which could be quite 
expensive. 42  
- Human actions that produce benefits for the actor but which also cause external 
costs are the norm. The idea that every harmful human behaviour should be 
associated with a tax could lead to a  need to tax a large number of human actions. 
- But a system that authorises certain activities in compliance with certain 
protections (by setting a legal standard of diligence), or that allows certain 
behaviours that do not involve high levels of external harm, is not called upon to 
implement costly and imperfect mechanisms for measuring harm, or taxes. 
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that Ronald Coase’s analysis sheds important light 
on the functioning of legal systems:  these systems, and those that seem to 
respond to a logic of economic efficiency, resort to solutions other than the 
internalization of social costs. For many activities they authorise or prohibit, they 
directly perform the assessment that economists would like to leave to the actors. 
At other times, they directly identify levels of precaution to which subjects must 
adapt themselves in order to avoid negative consequences. 
                                                 
42Commenting on the thinking of Baumol, who had found Pigou’s approach flawless, Ronald Coase 
expressed himself as follows: 
“It is obvious that what Baumol intended when he said, “taken on their own terrain, the conclusions of the 
Pigovian tradition are in fact flawless,” was that their logic was flawless, and that, if his tax proposals were 
carried out, even though that is impossible, the allocation of resources would be optimal. I have never 
dreamed of denying this. My point was simply that these taxation proposals are made of the stuff of 
dreams.”. (Ronald H. Coase, Notes on the Problems of Social Cost, supra note 1 at  185). 
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Legal systems resort more frequently to sanctions than to prices, to use Cooter’s 
language, and it may be said that the logic of jurists is often preferred to that of 
economists. 
 
